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8.1  Introduction 
In the decade following World War I1 the efficacy of monetary policy 
as a tool for stabilizing the economy was widely debated. Many reasons 
were offered for questioning the efficacy of monetary policy, but most of 
them derived from the  judgment that the interest elasticity of demand for 
money balances was or had become quite high. This was the main theme 
of Warren Smith’s influential article “On the Effectiveness of Monetary 
Po1icy”l and of numerous other writings in the early post-World  War I1 
period before and after the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord. 
The emphasis on interest elasticity was inspired by the theoretical 
notion of a “liquidity trap,”  D. H. Robertson’s (1940) apt phrase for 
the Keynesian special case of an infinitely elastic liquidity preference 
schedule, to which the monetary literature has obsessedly devoted so 
much attention.* A liquidity trap is clearly damaging to the efficacy of 
monetary policy, notwithstanding the Pigou wealth effect and the Pa- 
tinkin real-balance effect. This is so because it implies that open-market 
purchases will lead money holders to absorb additional money balances 
and open-market sales will lead them to absorb bonds without  any 
effect on aggregate spending on goods and services. To  be sure, if the 
elasticity is anything less  than infinite, open-market operations will 
affect such spending. The size of the operation required to produce the 
desired effect on spending in the short run is, nevertheless, positively 
related to the elasticity. If the elasticity is finite but very high, therefore, 
effective operations for stabilization purposes will have to be very large. 
The authors are grateful for comments on  an earlier draft from Karl Brunner, Franklin 
Edwards, Arthur Gandolfi, Benjamin Klein, James Lothian, Allan H. Meltzer, and Wil- 
liam Silber. 
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Why  be concerned about large operations? The resource costs of 
open-market operations do not rise with increases in size (money today 
is created at near zero marginal cost). Large operations are said to be 
harmful and undesirable because they have disruptive side effects on 
financial institutions and markets.’ Ironically, these effects have shown 
up mainly in periods of  severe monetary restraint (such as 1966 and 
1969-70)  precisely because of large changes in interest rates. For mod- 
erate changes of  monetary policy in which financial effects are toler- 
able, large operations would be a problem only if  the size of  errors in 
the execution of policy due to faulty forecasting were positively related 
to  the  size of  operations. If  so (which is not  at all obvious), high 
elasticity would mean that operations large enough to do the job ex- 
posed the economy to large errors of policy. It would then be better 
to rely on some other policy tool (if it exists) for which the effects of 
likely errors were smaller. 
Seeming support for these views came from the growing complexity 
of financial markets and particularly from the growing importance of 
financial intermediaries. Goldsmith’s empirical documentation of  The 
Share  of Financial Intermediaries  in National  Wealth and National 
Assets, I9049  was published in  1954 and heightened the recognition 
of this historical development. Financial intermediaries  were providing 
a rapidly growing quantity of deposit liabilities and other liquid assets 
which are close substitutes for checking account money. The widely 
discussed writings of Gurley and Shaw (1955,  1956, 1957) highlighted 
the diminished role of commercial banks in financial markets and raised 
doubts about the effectiveness of  traditional monetary policy,  since 
monetary authorities lacked control over a growing part of the financial 
system. Their conclusions were cautious, but many others extended 
their argument to claim that the growth of money substitutes had raised 
the interest elasticity of money demand and thus had reduced central 
bank control via open market operations. Later the Radcliffe Report 
in Great Britain (1959) viewed monetary policy as impotent, submerged 
in a sea of liquidity. The decline and fall of  monetary policy was pre- 
maturely but widely proclaimed. 
This earlier skepticism over the efficacy of  monetary policy has di- 
minished in the United States, and in recent years its powerful effects 
are generally acknowledged. Much controversy remains, however, par- 
ticularly concerning its proper conduct and whether a flexible policy 
is desirable. But the objection to a flexible policy is based on lags in 
the effects and is different from the earlier criticism based on allegedly 
high cross-elasticities between money and other assets. Controversies 
over monetary policy are a tradition which goes back centuries; the 
corner of  economics concerned with  monetary  theory would  seem 
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troversy reflects in part a desire to tidy up the history of  monetary 
economics and, more importantly, a desire to help resolve some of the 
questions left open. The implications of  the growth of  financial inter- 
mediaries, despite the earlier misconceptions, are still important to 
monetary theory and policy. 
The passage of  time allows us to test the centerpiece of  the earlier 
view: Has the growth of  financial intermediaries and other financial 
instruments increased the short-run interest elasticity of  demand for 
money balances (interpreted here as MI)?  This question summarizes 
the concern of most of the discussion since the 1950s. While the interest 
elasticity of money demand is pertinent to the effect of  the growth of 
financial intermediaries,  preoccupation with that elasticity in this paper 
does not imply a denial of channels of  monetary effects which bypass 
financial markets. 
An  earlier view expounded by  Henry Simons (1936) was that the 
growth of  money substitutes was contributing to financial instability, 
which could be interpreted to mean instability of the demand function 
for money expressed in terms of the usual variables. We  do not take 
up the instability argument here because it is largely neglected in the 
postwar literature dealing with the efficacy of  monetary policy. 
Three earlier studies presented estimates suggesting that the interest 
elasticity had declined. In his examination of the elasticity over a long 
period, Meltzer (1%3) provided decade estimates which showed a de- 
cline from the 1920s to the 1950s. He was concerned with other issues, 
however, and did not comment on the decline. Teigen (1964), who took 
a two-equation approach to allow for supply effects, estimated the 
short-run interest elasticity of money demand to be -  .09 from annual 
data for 1924-41  and -  .02 from quarterly data for 1946.IV- 1959.IV. 
He expressed surprise over the decline and attributed it to a reduction 
in the use of  money as a store of  wealth. Laidler (1966) reported a 
similar decline for first differences of  annual data 1919-40  and 1946- 
60  but virtually no change in the elasticity for levels of  the variables. 
Although we believe that the decline in interest elasticity that these 
three studies suggested was correct, their estimates of  the difference 
between the 1920s and post-World War I1 must be regarded as tentative. 
Only short stretches of the later period were available at the time those 
studies were undertaken. Furthermore, except for Meltzer’s, they in- 
cluded some data from 1942 to 1953-years  that were contaminated by 
the Federal Reserve bond-support program. 
At the time of  writing (1972) the period for estimating the interest 
elasticity since the end of  that program covered nearly twenty subse- 
quent years. For comparison with an earlier period of similar economic 
conditions, we selected 1921-31.  We  examined a variety of alternative 
regressions designed to make estimates for the earlier and the later 212  Phillip Cagan and Anna  J. Schwartz 
period fully comparable. Most of our estimates also show a decline in 
the interest elasticity. In a final section we discuss some reasons for 
the decline and the implications for policy. We  also point out, as have 
previous studies, that the short-run elasticity, while lower in the post- 
war period, has never been very high. 
8.2  Statistical Results 
To  test for changes in the interest elasticity of money demand, we 
estimated demand functions of various forms for quarterly data 1921  .I- 
1931.IV and 1954.1-1971.IV.  The first period begins on the earliest date 
for which quarterly GNP estimates are available. We  wanted to make 
the earlier period as long as possible but believed that the abnormal 
fluctuations following Britain’s suspension of gold payments should be 
excluded. The second period begins for obvious reasons with the actual 
(not official) termination of the Federal Reserve bond support program 
and ends with  the latest data available at the time of  computation. 
(Because of problems associated with the sharp rise in interest rates 
after 1965 discussed further below, we also use the truncated period 
1954.1- 1965  .IV.) We omitted from consideration the intervening period 
1932-53  because of  the series of  shocks due to the banking crisis, 
severe depression, wartime controls, and bond support program. The 
earlier period and the later truncated period are reasonably comparable 
in general economic climate (except perhaps for the business contrac- 
tion of 1921, which was more severe than any contraction since World 
War 11), but differ substantially in the relative importance of financial 
intermediaries. For example, the ratio of M,/M, in 1924 was .49, and 
in 1964 was .37.4 
In estimating the interest elasticity of  demand for money balances, 
we are immediately faced with a choice of  interest rates. Ideally, we 
should include the yields on all relevant  substitutes for money, but 
multicollinearity makes a broad inclusion impractical. We  have confined 
the statistical analysis to the average rate paid on savings deposits and 
to short-term rates on open-market instruments, principally commer- 
cial paper but also Treasury bills  and call money. We  interpret the 
concern in the literature over the efficacy of monetary policy to pertain 
to a short-run interest elasticity and, accordingly, we focus on short- 
term open-market rates. The particular series used were selected mainly 
because  they are available for both  periods; nevertheless,  they  are 
generally representative of short-term rates. 
In examining the efficacy of monetary policy, it is important to sep- 
arate the short-run from the long-run response of money demand to 
interest rates. Monetary policy also effects long-term rates; such effects 
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rates generally display the strongest response to policy and the strong- 
est effects on the demand for money balances. 
In addition to interest rates, money demand equations contain real 
income or wealth. We  use GNP, since it is the best of such aggregate 
series available quarterly for the earlier period. We  use current GNP 
rather than, as is common, some moving average to approximate the 
concept of permanent income. This transformation will affect the ab- 
solute size of the interest coefficient but very likely not the comparative 
size between periods. We  have omitted those variations in the speci- 
fication of the regression equation which appear least likely to affect 
the comparison between periods. 
8.2.1  A Standard Money Demand Equation 
A standard form is 
(1)  In MIP  = k+a In GNPIP+bi 
where In denotes natural logarithm, MIP is deflated money balances, 
GNPIP real gross national product, i a short-term interest rate, and k 
the constant intercept. k and a and b are regression coefficients to be 
estimated. To  deflate M  and GNP,  we use the consumer price index 
for the earlier period and the GNP  deflator (not available for the 1920s) 
for the later period. We  shall refer to b, which theoretically should be 
negative in this form of the function, as the interest coefficient or slope 
of demand (not elasticity), because it is the percentage change in de- 
mand with respect to arithmetic (not percentage) changes in the interest 
rate (measured as percent per ann~m).~  We  purposely do not use the 
logarithm of  the interest rate in  the equation in order to avoid the 
resulting blow-up of small changes which occurs at low levels of the 
interest  rate.  Unlike M and  GNP, the interest  rate is not  a  dollar 
magnitude but a percentage rate, and therefore it does not require a 
log transformation to avoid heteroscedasticity.6  Since the interest slope 
and elasticity move in the same direction, no important theoretical or 
policy issue is raised by our choice of form. 
Regressions of the form of equation (1) are shown in table 8.1. The 
most appropriate interest rate available for both periods is the com- 
mercial paper rate. As a second choice, we compare the call money 
rate in the earlier period with the three-month Treasury bill rate in the 
later period; call loans played a role in the  1920s paralleling that of 
Treasury bills in the post-World  War I1 money market. 
We  note that the interest coefficient has a larger negative value (sta- 
tistically significant) in the earlier period, but we were not disposed to 
accept these results without further examination of  some problems. 
For one thing, the interest coefficient for the later full period is positive 
(it should be negative to indicate a substitution between  money and 214  Phillip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz 
Table 8.1  Standard Money Demand Equation (In MIP  = k  + a In  GNPIP + 
6i9 
Regression Coefficients (and r  values) 
Commercial  Call Money  Treasury 
In  GNPIP  Paper Rate  Rate  Bill Rate  Adj. 
Period  a  b  b  b  R* 




1954.  I-  1965  .IV  .08 
(1.8) 
.04 





-  2.7 
(7.2) 
+  0.2 
(0.4) 
Source: See Appendix. 
Nore: Signs oft values have been dropped. Units of measurement: a is an elasticity, b 
is the percentage change in dependent variable per arithmetic change of  1 percentage 
point in the interest rate.  denotes a short-term interest rate, measured as a decimal 
like .04.  Estimate of the regression constant k is not shown. 
other assets). When the years after  1965  are omitted, the coefficient 
reverses sign. The positive coefficients are not statistically significant 
and may be interpreted as essentially zero. 
The later years present a problem. After 1966 the trend of the money 
stock relative to that of GNP rose, as is shown in figures 8.1 and 8.2 
by the slower upward trend in the velocity ratio (GNP to the money 
stock) for those years. The regression associates this change in relative 
trends with the sharp rise in the interest rate, which tends to pull the 
regression coefficient for the interest rate in a positive direction and 
thus hides all or part of  the negative substitution effect. The positive 
association is misleading: The change in relative trends of money and 
GNP after 1966 is not to be explained by the outbreak of inflation and 
the accompanying increase in the anticipated rate of inflation and in 
interest rates. The increase would, if anything, reduce the demand for 
money balances and raise the upward trend of velocity. It may be that 
the inflation increased uncertainty and for that reason increased money 
demand,’  but no proxy for uncertainty has found wide use, and we 
have not experimented with one. 
There is the additional problem that, to some extent, the positive 
coefficient may be indicative of an extraneous supply effect in which 215  Has the Growth of Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
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Fig. 8.1  Velocity, commercial paper rate, and average rate paid on 
savings deposits, quarterly, 1921 -3 1. 
rising interest rates induced an expansion of  the money stock. This 
supply effect may  have been stronger than usual during these years 
owing to the sharp restraints imposed by policy. We  have not tried to 
allow econometrically for supply effects for two reasons. One is the 
difficulty of  doing so satisfactorily. The second is that we  interpret 
other evidence to indicate that the interest elasticity of supply is usually 
small and equally unimportant in both periods, except perhaps for the 
years after 1965.* This is so  both with respect to the feedback on the 
deposit multiplier and consistency of  the response of  the monetary 
base to market rates. 
For purposes of this temporal comparison we focus on the truncated 
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Fig. 8.2  Velocity, commercial paper rate, and average rate paid on 
savings deposits, quarterly, 1954-71. 
do not alter our main conclusions. The unexplained change in trend is 
one piece of evidence of instability of the demand function, admittedly, 
but it does not shift the weight of  the evidence on the comparison of 
elasticities. 
A different problem of trend exists for the truncated period, because 
the variables all have had  steeply rising trends  since World War 11. 
Upward trends in velocity since World I1 appear to be worldwide oc- 
currence, which presumably  reflects in large part the accompanying 
rise in interest rates and inflation. But any other variable with a rising 
trend which has influenced money demand and is omitted from the 
regression will be collinear with the trends in GNP and the interest 
rate and be partly represented by them. If the interest rate happens to 
correlate with the omitted influence, the estimate of  the interest coef- 217  Has the Growth of Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
ficient will be affected. Omitted influences which may have been im- 
portant are the upward trend in the rate of interest on savings deposits, 
improvements in  their  quality  (in the  United  States due in  part to 
favorable terms enacted in 1950 for federal deposit insurance on savings 
and loan deposits), and improvements in cash management techniques 
and technology. Although the last two developments may have come 
at particular points in time, the response of money demand to them 
could have occurred slowly over many years and so have made their 
effects appear as a trend influence. 
The following tables report our various  attempts to allow for the 
trend by including other variables or short-run adjustment terms, in 
order to ascertain the effect, if any, on the estimates of the short-run 
interest elasticity.  Our conclusions  are presented  at the end of  this 
section. 
8.2.2  Money Demand Equations with a Variable to 
Account for Trend 
An appealing candidate for such a variable is the average rate paid 
on savings deposits. This is relevant to the growth of savings deposits 
as substitutes for demand deposits. It may be explained in part by a 
general  rise since World  War I1 in the interest rate paid on savings 
relative to a zero rate, because of the prohibition since 1933 on demand 
deposits. (We ignore checking charges as insignificant. The possibility 
that increases in  services or indirect payments on demand deposits 
took the place of prohibited interest payments is considered later.) The 
effect of the rise in the interest rate on savings deposits probably oc- 
curred gradually over many years; the short-run changes in this rate 
were small (even though the rates paid on large denomination certifi- 
cates of deposit beginning in  the mid-1960s behave like commercial 
paper rates), and the short-run response to its changes was likely low. 
If we allow for the gradual effect of the savings deposit rate on money 
demand, the commercial paper rate is relieved from acting as proxy 
for the upward trend in the savings deposit rate, and the coefficient of 
the paper rate should then reveal the short-run response of money 
demand to changes in open market rates. There is sufficient dissimi- 
larity between the movements in these two rates for the regression to 
distinguish their effects on money demand (see figures 8.1 and 8.2). 
Table 8.2 presents these regressions. The savings deposit rate, is, is 
an annual series interpolated for quarterly values. It is an average of 
the rates paid on U.S. postal savings and time and savings deposits of 
commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and savings and loan asso- 
ciations (the last was omitted as relatively unimportant for the earlier 
period), each weighted by the relative amounts outstanding. (The call 
money  and Treasury bill  rates are not used  here and subsequently, 218  Phip  Caglnn and  Anna J. Schwartz 
Table 8.2  Money Demand Equation with Two  Interest Rates In  MIP  = k  + 
a In  GNPIP +  fil + bic 
Regression Coefficients (and t values) 
Savings  Commercial 
In  GNPIP  Deposit Rate  Paper Rate  Adj. 
Period  a  f  b  R2 
1921.1-1931.IV  .45  +  6.4  -2.8  .89 
.49  -  -2.7  .89 
1954.1- l%S.IV  .69  -  11.8  -  0.7  .93 
1954.1- 1971 .IV  .73  -  11.5  +  0.4  .82 
(6.8)  (0.8)  (7.1) 
(15.8)  (7.2) 
(23.7)  (23.2)  (4.2) 
(11.4)  (9.3)  (1.4) 
Source: See Appendix. 
Note: Signs of r  values have been dropped. Units of measurement: same as for table 
8.1. is denotes the savings deposit rate and ic a short-term interest rate. Second line is 
taken from table 8.1. Estimate of the regression constant k is not shown. 
inasmuch as they gave essentially the same results in table 8.1 as the 
commercial paper rate did.) 
While the savings deposit rate has the correct negative sign for the 
later period and helps to raise the implausibly low GNP elasticity as 
compared with table 8.1, the inclusion of this rate has no effect on the 
coefficient of  the commercial paper rate (except to raise its statistical 
significance), which still appears to be lower (in absolute value) for the 
later periods and incorrectly positive for the later full period. The 
savings deposit rate has an incorrect positive sign for the earlier period, 
but the coefficient is not statistically significant and probably should 
be disregarded. The results with it omitted in that period are also shown. 
This rate displayed very little variation in the earlier period (the max- 
imum range was from 3.5 to 3.8 percent per annum) and so had too 
little effect on money demand to be measured adequately, unlike its 
substantial long-run rise in the later period. 
8.2.3  Velocity Equations with Trend Influences 
For most of this century taken as a whole, MI velocity has no clear- 
cut trend, and estimates of  the elasticity of  MI with respect to wealth 
or permanent income for periods before World War I1 with a span of 
two decades or longer are around unity. (See Meltzer  1963.)  Yet  in 
tables 8.1 and 8.2 the elasticity for real GNP is well below unity. What 
is the reason? We  have thought of three possibilities, the last of which 
may affect our estimates of the interest coefficient. First, the income 219  Has the Growth of  Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
elasticity of transactions velocity may in fact be below unity, as Irving 
Fisher believed, but the income elasticity used to be dominated by a 
higher income elasticity of balances held as a store of wealth. These 
may  no  longer  dominate  because  of  the  availability  since  World 
War I1 of  many good substitutes. Second, our use of  current GNP 
incorporates transitory changes, which by the permanent-income the- 
ory have smaller effects on money demand than the permanent com- 
ponent (but see Darby 1972) and therefore pull the estimated elasticity 
below the long-run level of unity. Since transitory changes are a larger 
fraction of  total variance in shorter periods, this may explain the low 
elasticities for the 1920s as well as post-World  War 11.  Finally, third, 
there could be a statistical misattribution of  trends.  If  the negative 
effect of the interest rate is suppressed for some reason and its regres- 
sion coefficient becomes zero or positive, the rising trend of  GNP 
relative to the money stock in the post-World  War I1 period can be 
“explained”  in the regression by  reducing the coefficient for GNP. 
This may account for the very low estimates of the real GNP elasticity 
for the later period in table 8.1. 
To test whether trend movements were improperly lowering the GNP 
elasticity and thereby introducing difficulties for the interest coeffi- 
cients, we forced the GNP  elasticity to be unity. The results, presented 
in table 8.3 increase the effect of the savings deposit rate and lower 
that of the commercial paper rate, which nonetheless was still larger 
for the earlier peri~d.~ 
With monetary velocity as the dependent variable, the theoretically 
correct signs of the interest-rate coefficients are positive. The problem 
’hble 8.3  Velocity Equation with Two  Interest Rates In  V = k  +  fi’ + bic 
Regression Coefficients (and t values) 
Period 
Savings  Commercial 
Deposit Rate  Paper Rate  .  Adj . 
f  b  R2 
1921 .I-  I931 .IV  50.0 
(8.3) 








1954.  I-  197 1  .IV  16.4  -0.1  .98 
(33.0)  (0.3) 
Source: See Appendix. 
Note: Signs of t values have been dropped. Units of measurement: for V, percentage 
change in velocity per year; for other coefficients, same as for table 8.1. V is GNPIM, 
P is savings deposit rate, and ic is a short-term interest rate. Estimate of the regression 
constant k is not shown. 220  Phillip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz 
with the years after 1965, noted above, is exemplified here by a negative 
coefficient for the commercial paper rate. The reason for the wrong 
sign is not hard to find: The slower upward trend of velocity after 1966 
is not explained by the savings deposit rate. It continues to rise despite 
the largely unchanged regulatory ceilings on these rates,’O because the 
rates paid by many institutions were still below the ceilings and could 
go higher. Consequently, the regression “calls upon”  the commercial 
paper rate, which rose sharply after 1965 as did all other open market 
rates, to explain this decline in trend of velocity, thus turning the coef- 
ficient of the paper rate negative-quite inappropriately. Since the out- 
break of the Vietnam inflation and associated increases in interest rate 
would explain a rise in monetary velocity, the decline in trend remains 
a puzzle.ll It is not readily explained by any of the other variables 
commonly included in the money demand function such as permanent 
rather than current income-which  is used to distinguish between an- 
ticipated  and  transitory  changes in income.  No  sharp difference in 
trends occurred between current and permanent income, however mea- 
sured, after 1966. 
Confining our attention to the top two regressions in the table, we 
find that the coefficient of the paper rate was lower in the later period 
than in the 1920s. This is also true of the savings deposit rate by a large 
margin. A deposit-rate coefficient of  17 for the later period does not 
seem too high as a reflection of the substitution between savings and 
demand deposits. (It means that the demand for money balances de- 
clines 17 percent for each rise in the rate of  1 percentage point.) The 
coefficient of 50 for the 1920s does seem too high, however, since these 
assets (except for postal  savings) were not federally insured and for 
this reason, among others, were not as good substitutes for demand 
deposits then as they became in the  1950s.’* As already noted, the 
savings deposit rate changed very little during the earlier period, and 
such a high coefficient suggests that it is spuriously representing other 
influences. If we exclude it for the earlier period, the simple regression 
of In GNPIM on the paper rate gives a smaller coefficient of 1.4 (n. 9), 
which is still larger than those for the later period in table 8.2. If we 
force the deposit-rate coefficient to be the same in both periods by 
means of a pooled regression, we obtain a higher coefficient for the 
commercial paper rate in the earlier period, though not significantly 
higher.  l3 
In the absence of a common proxy for trend influences on velocity 
in both periods, we may as an alternative employ a simple time trend 
like T in table 8.4. The results show once again that the simple cor- 
relation between velocity and the commercial paper rate in the later 
period (n. 9) reflects the trend in these series. The response of money 
demand to interest-rate deviations from the later trend gives a coeffi- 221  Has the Growth of  Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
Table 8.4  Velocity Equation with Time Trend In  V = k  + gT + bic 
Regression Coefficients (and t values) 
Period 
Linear  Commercial 
Time Trend  Paper Rate  Adj . 
g  b  R* 
1921.1-1931.IV  1.43 
1954.1- 1965.  IV  3.31 
(55.9) 
1954.1- 197  1  .IV  3.07 
(31.2) 
(4.2) 









Source: See Appendix. 
Note:  Signs oft  values have been dropped. Units of measurement: same as for tables 
8.1 and 8.3. T is a linear time trend, increasing one integer per year. Estimate of the 
regression constant k is not shown. 
cient in table 8.4 of a little above unity (0.3 including 1966-71),  only 
about one-third the size of  the coefficient for the 1920s. 
The strong upward  trend  in  velocity  since World  War  I1 can be 
interpreted as representing a long-run response to increases in the total 
return to money substitutes (including nonpecuniary returns from man- 
agement technology and quality).  Until  a measure of this return  is 
provided, we cannot estimate the corresponding demand elasticity. But, 
for present purposes, that is not crucial. The time trend is satisfactory 
as long as it correctly tracks long-run influences. Admittedly, a linear 
time trend  may  spuriously absorb some of the correlation between 
velocity and the paper rate, thus reducing the estimate of the short- 
run interest-rate effect. Although future developments will provide a 
test of this possibility (since these influences should gradually slacken), 
at present it remains unconfirmed. 
As an alternative approach we may turn to adjustment equations, 
which are also designed to abstract from long-run influences. 
8.2.4  Demand Equations with Short-Run Adjustments 
A standard adjustment equation postulates that 
(2)  Aln V = e(ln Vd - In V), 
in which the change in velocity is proportional to the percentage dif- 
ference between desired (Vd) and actual velocity. In discrete form, 
(3)  In V, = eln V;i + (1 - e) In Vt-, 
where 
(4)  In V;i = fl + bi; + k 222  Phillip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz 
and 
Substituting (4) into (3) we derive 
(5)  In V,  = ek  + efis + ebif + (1 - e) In V,-l 
where efand  eb are the short-run (within one quarter) responses to 
changes in  interest rates. Regressions of  this form are presented in 
table 8.5. 
These regressions also show the short-run interest effect to be larger 
in the earlier period. The estimate for the later period is held down, 
however, by  the unusually high coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable, as a result of the strong upward trend in velocity. (As noted 
before, this is responsible for the very high implied estimates of  the 
long-run effects, herefand b.) To circumvent this trend bias, the third 
line shows the results of a regression in which the adjustment coefficient 
1 - e is assigned the (lower) value estimated for the 1920s. As a result, 
the estimates of the short-run interest effect are raised, though they 
still lie below those for the earlier period. 
The equations in Table 8.5 presuppose that money balances are ad- 
justed  to their desired level relative to GAP-which  is to say that 
monetary velocity is the variable being adjusted. An  alternative and 
Table 8.5  Velocity Equation with Adjustment Term In  V, = ek  + efi: + ebi: 
+ (1 -  e) In  V,-l 
Regression Coefficients (and t values) 
Period 
Savings  Commercial  Lagged 
Deposit Rate  Paper Rate  Velocity  Adj . 
ef  eb  1-e  RZ 
1921.1- 1931  .IV  28.8  +  1.2  0.41  .68 
1954.1- 1965.W  3.6  +0.5  0.77  .99 
1 -  e set* = .41  9.7  +0.8  -  .98 
1954.1-1971.IV  -0.1  +0.05  0.99  .997 
(2.9)  (2.0)  (2.6) 
(2.0)  (2.1)  (7.4) 
(33.8)  (3.5) 
(0.1)  (0.4)  (19.3) 
Source: See Appendix. 
Note: Signs oft  values have been dropped. For units of measurement and other notes: 
see tables 8.1  and 8.3. e is percentage adjustment in  dependent variable per quarter. 
Estimate of  regression constant k is not shown. 
*Regression equation is (In  V, - .41 In  V,-l) = ek  + efi: + ebif. 223  Has the Growth of Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
more common adjustment equation is based on money balances alone, 
where GNP helps determine the desired balances. 
(6)  Aln M,  = e(ln Mf - In Mr-l) 
(7)  In Mf = k  + a In GNP, + fis + b$. 
Substituting (7) into (6) gives 
(8)  In M,  = ek + ea In GNP, + efis + ebi; + (1 -  e) In Mr-l. 
Regressions of  this form are presented in  table 8.6. (The savings 
deposit rate is not statistically significant in these equations and has 
little effect on the other coefficients; hence it has been omitted.) The 
coefficient of  the commercial paper rate is very small but still double 
that in the later period after we assign the earlier value to the adjustment 
factor for the later period; otherwise it takes on a meaningless value 
above unity. 
In adjustment equations the dependent variable is conventionally 
measured in undeflated dollars (since to measure in real terms implies 
an immediate adjustment of  prices), and we have followed that con- 
vention in table 8.6. However, in doing so we implicitly assume that 
the elasticities of demand with respect to real GNP and to the price 
level are the same, since these two influences are combined in the GNP 
variable. (In equation (l),  without the adjustment term, however, the 
elasticity with respect to the price level was unity and that of real GNP 
Table 8.6  Money Demand Equation with Adjustment Term In  MI = ek  + 
ea In  GNP, + ebi; + (1 - e)  In  MI+, 
Regression Coefficients (and r values) 
Period 
Commercial  Lagged 
In  GNP  Paper Rate  In  M  Adj . 
ea  eb  1-e  RZ 
1921 .I- 1931 .IV  .21 
(5.2) 
1954.1-1965.IV  -  .02 
(0.9) 
1 - e set* = .61  .I5 
(19.4) 










~~~  ~~ 
.61  .96 
1.14  .996 
-  .93 
(8.1) 
(21.3) 
1.01  .999 
(52.4) 
Source: See Appendix. 
Note: Signs oft  values have been dropped. Units of measurement and other notes: see 
table 8.1. e is percentage adjustment in dependent variable per quarter. Estimate of 
regression constant k is not shown. 
*Regression equation is (In MI  - .61 In  = ek  + ea In  GNP, + ebi;. 224  PhiUip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz 
was allowed to be less than unity.) We  can avoid this assumption by 
separating GNP into its real component and its price component, each 
with its own coefficient. This is usually not done because of difficulties 
in measuring the elasticity of the price deflator for short periods. Al- 
ternatively, we can avoid the assumption by treating real balances as 
the adjusting variable. (See Goldfeld 1973.) This has the drawback of 
implying either that the price level adjusts immediately to discrepancies 
between actual and desired balances while real GNP adjusts with a 
lag, or that the price level is to be taken as given and not affected by 
the discrepancy. Either assumption seems to us theoretically untenable, 
though as a practical empirical question it does not appear to matter 
much (as Goldfeld shows), since the price level deviates very little 
quarter to quarter from its trend. 
Table 8.7  presents regressions with real balances as the adjusting 
variable. These regressions are more acceptable than those of table 8.6 
for the later period, in that the adjustment coefficient 1 - e is less than 
unity. It is nevertheless implausibly high, though somewhat lower when 
the interest rates are measured in logarithmic form (bottom panel);I4 
and the savings deposit rate for the earlier period is inappropriately 
positive though statistically insignificant. In any event, these regres- 
sions still show the coefficient for the commercial paper rate to be 
larger (in absolute value) for the earlier period. 
A third way to avoid the assumption that the elasticity of  the price 
deflator is the same as that of  real GNP, and hence that the former 
Table 8.7  Real Money Demand Equation with Adjustment Term 
In  (MIP), = ek + en In  (GNPIP), + ef;: + ebif  + (I -  e)  In  (MIP),-  1 
Regression Coefficients (and t values) 
Commercial 
In  GNPIP  Deposit Rate  Paper Rate  In  MIP  Adj. 
Period  en  ef  eb  I-e  RZ 
192  1 .I- 193 1  .IV  .06  +4.04  -  .90  .76  .98 
1954.I-1971.IV  .05  -  .05  -  .47  .98  .99 
(1.5)  (1.2)  (3.9)  (13.0) 
(1.8)  (0.1)  (6.0  (29.7) 
Same Equation But with Logarithm of Interest Rate 
192  1  .I-  193 1 .IV  .07  +.16  -  .04  .74  .98 
1954.1- 1971 .IV  .10  -  .02  -  .02  .89  .99 
(1.7)  (1.3)  (4.1)  (I 2.0) 
(2.8)  (1.1)  (6.4)  (16.5) 
Source: See Appendix. 
Nore: Signs oft values have been dropped. Units of measurement and other notes: see 
table 8.1. e is percentage adjustment in  dependent variable per  quarter. Estimate of 
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can be less than unity (implying “money illusion”), is to set both equal 
to unity, that is, in (8) set a = 1. Then 
(9)  In M, - In GNP, = k - In GNP, + e In GNP, 
+ ef;s + ebi; + (1 -  e)ln M,-l 
or 
(10) 
This is the general form used in a recent version of the (then named) 
FRB-MIT-Penn econometric model (197  l).I5 
These regressions, presented in table 8.8 are one of the only two 
forms in which we found a larger coefficient for the commercial paper 
rate in the later truncated period than in the earlier period (the other 
was reported in n. 9). Both coefficients, however, are extremely small, 
as is the difference in size which makes them practically the same. 
Furthermore, these regressions are also not acceptable because of the 
unrealistically low adjustment speed (4 to 9 percent per quarter). This 
may  result  in part from upward  bias  in  the adjustment term  1 -  e 
created by  using concurrent  GNP in the dependent and the lagged 
variable. l6 
In (MIGNP), = ek  + efl + ebi; + (1 - e)ln (M,-,/GNP,). 
8.2.5  Summary of Statistical Results 
Despite the difficulties of fitting a satisfactory money demand equa- 
tion to the post-World  War I1 period because of  unresolved questions 
regarding the explanation for the relative trends in the variables, we 
believe that we have gone far enough to establish that the coefficient 
Table 8.8  Money Demand Equation with Adjustment Term  and Unitary 
Income Elasticity 
In  (MIGNP), = ek  + ebi;  + (1 - e) In  (M,-,IGNP,) 




Paper Rate  In  (M,-  ,/GNP,)  Adj . 
eb  1-e  R2 
1921 .I- 1931 .IV  -  0.4 
(1.6) 
1954.1-1965.W  -0.5 
(5.1) 











Source: See Appendix. 
Note: Signs oft values have been dropped. Units of measurement and other notes: See 
tables 8.1 and 8.3. e is percentage adjustment in M per quarter. Estimate of  regression 
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(in absolute value) of  a short-term interest rate is not higher in this 
period than in  the 1920s and by most estimates is lower. This result 
does not appear to depend upon the interest-rate series used. The only 
regression in which the later period gave a significantly larger coefficient 
was for velocity on the commercial paper rate alone, with no other 
variable to account for the post-war upward trend in velocity. But that 
result clearly reflected a collinearity of trends, not the short-run vari- 
ations which are relevant to the efficacy of monetary policy. The coef- 
ficient of  the short-term interest rate was about the same or smaller 
for the later period in all the other equations which we fit to allow for 
trend influences on velocity: by including the savings deposit rate or a 
time trend, or by allowing for short-run adjustments. We  interpret the 
results to mean that the short-run interest sensitivity of money demand 
has declined at least moderately since the 1920s. 
Although many of the estimates of the long-run response to interest 
rates are sizable, the short-run response appears to be quite small in 
the earlier as well as the later period. Most of the short-run coefficients 
are less than 5  and many are around  1/2 (in absolute value). When 
multiplied by .04 to convert to an elasticity, this gives a range of .2 to 
.02. These estimates are on the low  side but  still within the range 
presented in most earlier studies.  l7 These numbers imply, for example, 
that an increase in the annual rate of growth of the money stock by a 
sizable 6 percentage points for one month (that is, an increase in MI 
of  112  percent in one month) would depress short-term interest rates 
by  1/2  divided by  coefficients ranging from 5 to  1/2. The change in 
short-term rates would be 0.1 to 1 percentage points, not an implausible 
range. 
All of our equations treat the rate of  return on money as constant. 
Charges on checking accounts we have intentionally ignored as of little 
importance, but deductions against fixed charges and services provided 
by commercial banks on  these accounts could be important. Banks are 
able to increase the marginal return on demand deposits by raising the 
deduction against fixed charges on these accounts. The deduction var- 
ies with the minimum or average balance and so provides an implicit 
marginal rate of return. This rate has certainly risen over the postwar 
period, so that the net rate of return on money substitutes has risen 
less rapidly than gross interest rates.'* In addition, due to the prohi- 
bition of  interest payments on demand deposits in  1933, commercial 
banks under competition have an incentive to provide services in lieu 
of interest. They also have an incentive to pay interest implicitly through 
lower net interest charges on loans to business depositors. 
Since market interest rates probably overstate the changes in the net 
return  on  open-market  instruments relative  to  that  on  money,  our 
regressions bias the interest coefficient downward, and perhaps more 227  Has the Growth of  Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
so in the later period when services and implicit interest payments were 
likely to be more important.  We  know of no satisfactory method of 
allowing for this bias.19  Nevertheless, we strongly doubt its short-run 
importance.  Account charges and services change very little in re- 
sponse to short-run changes in open market operations, which we are 
mainly concerned with here. 
8.3  Implications for Monetary Policy 
How could a decline in the interest sensitivity of money demand have 
occurred alongside the growth of money substitutes? There is an ob- 
vious reason. As Alvin Marty (1961) suggested might happen in his 
review of the Gurley-Shaw thesis, the growth of substitutes has shifted 
the money demand function to the left and in good part extinguished 
the holdings which were once close substitutes for savings deposits. 
These were balances which satisfied a “wealth”  or “asset”  demand 
for money. The remaining holdings have come to be largely “trans- 
actions” balances, and their demand is, presumably, less sensitive to 
changes in interest rates.*O Our results give empirical substance to these 
theoretical conjectures. 
Given that the response of  money demand to changes in  interest 
rates has declined, inversion of the relationship implies that a given 
amount of change in the money stock now produces a larger short-run 
effect on interest rates.*’ This increases monetary effects on interest 
rates and, for a given size of policy action, increases the short-run 
effect on  that part of aggregate spending which is influenced by interest 
rates. These implications are the opposite of those which in the 1950s 
were thought to prevail because of the mistaken presumption that the 
interest elasticity was increasing with the growth of money substitutes. 
The important question for monetary policy is no longer  seen as 
whether open market operations affect aggregate demand but as  how the 
effect is distributed over time. In the standard theory, the smaller the 
effect on interest rates of an open-market operation, the smaller the ini- 
tial effect on aggregate expenditures (the final effect at full-employment 
levels remains the same). Consequently, the earlier view implied that 
the growth of substitutes was lengthening the lag in monetary effects. 
But, insofar as a given monetary policy now has greater short-run ef- 
fects on the economy but the same final effect, the average lag is shorter. 
The growth of money substitutes may also affect the lag in monetary 
policy by reducing the ratio of money to total financial wealth or GNP, 
entirely aside from any effect  via the  interest  sensitivity  of  money 
demand. A lower ratio of money to GNP means that the multiplier of 
the final effect of monetary policy on the economy is larger, and it is 
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an initial change in the money stock. We  mention this possibility as 
relevant to the lag question without being at all sure of the answer. 
Discussions of  money  substitutes  in  the literature  have  skirted the 
complex question of the dynamics of monetary policy. Yet a longer lag 
complicates the execution of monetary stabilization policies and is at 
the heart of the difficulties in pursuing a flexible policy. 
In an earlier paper (Cagan and Schwartz 1975) we measured the lag 
between step turns in monetary growth and business cycle turns before 
and after World War 11.  We found that the lag appeared to be the same or 
slightly shorter in the recent period than formerly. So far, therefore, the 
growth of money substitutes has not made the lag perceptibly longer. Per- 
haps the effect on the lag of adecrease in interest sensitivity and adecline 
in the ratio of money to GNP  have offset each other. Whether future re- 
ductions in money demand, if they occur, will henceforth work to lengthen 
the lag remains to be seen. In any event, even at present the lag is suf- 
ficiently long and unreliable, as experience in 1966,1969, and 1970 dem- 
onstrates, to pose formidable problems for a flexible monetary policy. 
One further implication of these results concerns the effect of fiscal 
deficits. According to the usual formulation, the effect of a government 
deficit on aggregate demand increases with the interest sensitivity of 
money demand. This dependence pertains to the residual effect after 
the deficit borrowing has produced adjustments in private portfolios 
and crowding-out effects on private investment that partially offset the 
initial impact on GNP of the change in the government budget.(Lags 
probably delay this offset.) An increase in the deficit financed by Trea- 
sury borrowing which, for example, raised the commercial paper rate 
by  1 percentage point would by one of our results reduce money de- 
mand by 0.7 percent  compared with 2.7 percent  in  the  1920s (table 
8.2). The lower the interest sensitivity of money demand, the smaller 
is the effect on GNP of fiscal deficits. 
Paradoxical as it seems at first, the growth of money substitutes has, 
if anything, increased the effectiveness of monetary policy and reduced 
the effect of fiscal policy. 
Appendix 
Data Sources 
MI:  Currency held by the public plus adjusted demand deposits at 
all commercial banks,  quarterly averages of  monthly figures, 
seasonally adjusted. 
1921-31:  Friedman and Schwartz (1970), table 1, col. 8. 229  Has the Growth of Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
1954-71: ibid. through  1963; thereafter, Federal  Reserve Bul- 
letin, Nov.  1971, p. 884, and Mar.  1972, p. A-17. 
1921-31:  Consumer price index  (1957-58  = 100).  Bureau  of 
Labor Statistics Release, Consumer Price Index-U.S.: 
All Items, 1913-60,  Series  A, quarterly averages of 
monthly figures. 
1954-71:  GNP deflator (1958 = loo), quarterly, seasonally ad- 
justed.  The National Income and Product Accounts 
of the  United States, 1929-65,  through  1963; there- 
after, Survey ofCurrent Business, July 1968 for 1964- 
65; July 1969 for 1965-66; July 1970 for 1966-67; July 
1971 for 1967-68; July 1972 for 1968-71. 
GNP: Gross national product in current prices, quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted at annual rates. 
1921-31:  Compiled by Harold Barger and Lawrence R. Klein. 
See Business Cycle Indicators, vol. 2, G.  H. Moore, 
ed., Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press for NBER, 1961, 
p.  133. Series 16.1 for series in form of quarterly totals. 
P: 
1954-71:  Same as for GNP deflator, above. 
Commercial paper rate, quarterly averages of monthly figures, 
seasonally adjusted by NBER. 
1921-31:  F.  R.  Macaulay,  The Movements  of  Interest  Rates, 
Bond  Yields, and Stock Prices  in  the  United States 
since  1856,  New  York:  NBER,  1938,  table  10, 
1954-71:  Weekly figures from Bank and Quotation Record of 
Call money rate, quarterly averages of monthly figures, season- 
ally adjusted by NBER through June 1931. 
1921-31:  Same as for commercial paper rate, above. 
Treasury bill rate, market yield on 3-month bills, quarterly av- 
erages of monthly figures. 
1954-71 : Supplement to Banking and Monetary Statistics, Sec- 
tion 12, Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve 
System,  1966,  for  1954-63,  pp. 51-52;  thereafter, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, monthly issues. 
Savings deposit rate, annual average of rates paid on U.S. postal 
savings and time  and  savings deposits of  commercial  banks, 
mutual savings banks, and savings and loan associations (omit- 
ted for 1921-31), each weighted by relative amounts outstand- 
ing, interpolated along a straight line to mid-quarter values. 
1921-31:  Friedman  and Schwartz (1970), table 9, p.  173, ex- 
tended to 1932; rate paid on member commercial bank 
time deposits, extrapolated before  1927  on basis of 
ic: 
pp. A158-160. 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle: or 
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rate on mutual savings deposits, used as proxy for all 
commercial bank time deposits. 
1954-71:  same as for 1921-31,  p.  174, extended to 1972. 
Notes 
1. Smith (1956),  “I am arguing that the liquidity preferences of the public 
are typically quite elastic, so  that it is ordinarily possible for potential spenders 
or their financial agents . . .  to find buyers of such securities among the holders 
of idle cash balances without producing a rise in interest rates large enough to 
have a very great effect on expenditures”  (n. 45). 
2. For a claim of empirical support for the liquidity trap, see Latan6 (1960). 
“If bonds are a good substitute for money, and other assets are relatively poor 
substitutes, which seems a reasonable hypothesis, then a change in money 
supply will tend to affect the bond market rather than spending on other assets. 
Under these conditions the interest elasticity of demand for cash balances has 
considerable influence on the effectiveness of  monetary policy . . .  Large dif- 
ferences in the logarithms of MIY are accompanied by very small differences 
in the logarithms of interest rates, thus indicating a very high interest elasticity 
of demand for proportionate cash balances if the observations fall on the same 
demand schedule. This would support the Keynesian ‘liquidity trap’ theory” 
(p. 448). See also Tobin (1947). 
3. It is worth remembering that Keynes became disillusioned with monetary 
policy for the opposite reason, namely, that when needed, central banks failed 
to conduct bold operations in long-term debt markets. 
4. MI  is currency outside banks and adjusted demand deposits. M3  includes 
also postal savings with the U.S.  Post Office, time and savings deposits in 
mutual savings banks, commercial banks, and savings and loan associations. 
See Fnedman and Schwartz (1970),  table 1, cols. 8 and 13. 
5. The interest rate is measured in the regressions as a decimal, such as .04. 
Then b = (d In M)ldi = (d 100 In  M)/d 100 i), the form given in the tables, 
may be referred to as the percentage change in demand with respect to arith- 
metic changes in the interest rate in percentage points. 
6. Thus a coefficient of  1 means that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
interest rate (say from 4 to 5 percent per year) raises money demand by  1 
percent. To convert to an elasticity, we may express this arithmetic change in 
the interest rate as a ratio or percentage change, 114  or 25  percent, and take 
the ratio of such changes in the two variables: (dMlA4)l(dil~  = 1%125%  = .04. 
Hence the coefficient can be converted to an elasticity by multiplying by the 
average level of  the interest rate in  decimal form. The average level of the 
commercial paper rate in the three periods in decimal form is .044  for 1921- 
31,  .035 for 1954-65,  and .044 for 1954-71.  As a further example applicable 
to all  three periods,  a  coefficient of  5  approximates  an elasticity of  5  x 
.04 = .2. 
The very small size of our estimates generally agrees with the results obtained 
by Teigen (1964) and Laidler (1%6),  both of whom also used the commercial 
paper rate. Meltzer’s estimates (1963) are much larger (by 5 to 25 times or so), 
which can be explained by his use of Durand’s series on basic corporate bond 
yields. That series has appreciably less fluctuation than the paper rate and, in 231  Has the Growth of Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
consequence, tends to give a larger regression coefficient.  We  obtain results 
comparable to Meltzer’s for the savings deposit rate. 
Most authors have measured interest rates in logarithmic form. In particular, 
Goldfeld (1973) obtained good results from such a form for the postwar period, 
and we present a comparable equation below in table 8.7. Otherwise, we used 
the  nonlogarithmic  form  of  interest  rates  because  we  believe  it  is  more 
appropriate. 
7. Juster and Wachtel (1972) argue that inflation creates uncertainty, which 
is the reason for the high ratios of household  saving to disposable income in 
the late 1960s. 
8. See Rasche (1972) and Cagan (1969). 
9. If we constrain the GNP  elasticity to  unity but do  not add another variable, 
the  estimated  interest  coefficient  for the  later  truncated  period  is  higher 
(In  V  = 9.9%  + k, compared with 1.4 for the earlier period), but this simply 
reflects an incorporation  into the interest-rate coefficient of the unexplained 
upward trend in velocity. 
10.  Except  mainly  for  the  increase  to  6  percent  in  1968  for  large 
negotiable  certificates  of  deposit  of  3-6  month  maturity,  and  to  6V4 
percent  for  longer  maturities,  and  in  1970  for  savings  deposits  of  two- 
year  maturity. 
11. For the problem of deposits held by foreigners, which apparently became 
relatively large during this period and may have contributed to the change in 
trend of measured velocity, see Burger and Balbach (1972). 
Since writing this passage in 1972, we notice that velocity has been growing 
more rapidly again in  1973 and 1974. This may indicate  that the slowing of 
the upward trend was confined to the period  1966-72  and reflected, perhaps, 
uncertainty over inflation (see n. 7) to which the public is now beginning to 
adjust. 
Goldfeld (1973) fits a demand function  to the full period  1952-1972  with 
reasonable success but by using a form of the equation which we find ques- 
tionable. His results are discussed below. 
12. Although the coefficient of 50 for the 1920s is implausibly high, we do 
not argue that it should necessarily be lower then than later. A wholesale shift 
of money balances held as a store of wealth to other more attractive assets in 
the early post-World  War  I1  years may  have  reduced the elasticity  of  the 
remaining money balances with respect to these assets. This possibility,  sug- 
gested by Marty (1961) and Teigen (1964), is discussed later. 
13. The regression is In  V = kl + k2 +  Ji” + b,if + b&, where the subscript 
1 denotes the earlier period  1921-31  and 2 the later period  1954-65,  and the 
variables are zero outside their designated periods. The estimated coefficients 
aref  = 18.4, b, = 1.5, and bz = 0.2. Hence bl - b2 = 1.3 (with a t statistic 
of  1.1). 
14. The bottom panel regressions  are in the form used by Goldfeld (1973) 
and differ from his only in that he used the time deposit rate instead of the 
average rate on time and savings deposits and he covered the longer period 
1952.11- 1972.1V.  Goldfeld’s  equation (table 18,  for ordinary least  squares) 
gave: 
In Time  In Commercial  Lagged 
In  GNPIP  Deposit Rate  Paper Rate  In MIP  R2 
.I8  -  .04  -  .02 
(5.4)  (4.1)  (8.2) 
.75  .99 
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15. In  this model  the money-demand  equation  also includes  the  savings 
deposit rate and the change in the discount rate. 
16. The Durbin-Watson  statistics for the adjustment equations in tables 5- 
8 are somewhat higher than those for the previous regressions but are still well 
below 2, indicating appreciable autocorrelation  of the residuals. This is a de- 
ficiency of these equations which we did not believe would be properly handled 
by the standard assumption of a first-order linear relation between the residuals. 
Goldfeld does make the correction for first-order serial correlation of the re- 
siduals but also shows the results without the correction. There is virtually no 
difference in the regression coefficient of the commercial paper rate between 
his corrected and uncorrected  equations (Goldfeld,  1973, table 18). 
17. For some recent estimates, which fall at the lower end of the range, see 
Zwick (1971), Feldstein and Eckstein (1970), and Goldfeld (1973). 
18. Barro and Santomero present  estimates of this marginal rate based on 
survey data. When their estimate is subtracted from the savings deposit rate, 
the net rate reaches a peak in 1963 and remains practically  level for the next 
five years. This plateau helps partially but does not by itself fully explain the 
slowing of the upward trend in velocity after 1966, since the breaks in trend 
of the two series differ in timing by several years. 
19. The marginal rate compiled by Barro and Santomero (1972) is an annual 
series based on  their survey of selected large banks. No independent data exist 
to indicate how representative it is of the entire banking system. Consequently, 
we have not used their series to derive a net interest rate. 
Benjamin Klein (1973) measures the nonpecuniary yield of  services on de- 
mand deposits by the open-market interest rate rimes the complement of the 
reserve ratio for demand deposits. The rationale is that this approximates the 
gross return to banks of their demand deposit liabilities, and under competition 
banks would use a fraction of it to attract deposits. This measure cannot be 
properly used in our short-run money equations  for technical reasons, however, 
because the complement of the reserve ratio changes little in the short run. 
Hence this measure correlates almost perfectly with the open-market interest 
rate and provides no additional explanation of short-run variations in money 
balances. 
20. Data on the ownership of demand deposits (Shapiro 1943; Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, various issues) show very little change between consumer and busi- 
ness sectors from 1929 to 1960. But the reduction in interest-sensitive holdings 
within  each sector could  have been  substantial.  Unfortunately,  we have  no 
method  of  measuring such holdings  and must  rely on our estimates of the 
interest sensitivity of aggregate money balances. 
Nevertheless, balances held by both sectors remain high in relation to sales 
or income  in  terms of any reasonable  transactions  use (see Friedman  and 
Schwartz 1970,  p. 107).  “Nontransactions”  holdings  of  money  have  by  no 
means disappeared. 
21. This inference assumes that the short-run demand for money is always 
equal to actual balances  held, so that any change in balances  held  must be 
accompanied  by  sufficiently  large  changes  in  interest  rates immediately  to 
equate the demand and supply. The adjustment equations reported above allow 
for a lag in response of money demand to changes in interest rates but not for 
the obverse lag of portfolio adjustments in response to open market operations. 
But undoubtedly  there is such an obverse lag, and it is relevant  here to the 
extent that it is not the same in the earlier and later periods, as  the text statement 
assumes. 233  Has the Growth of Money Substitutes Hindered Monetary Policy? 
The disregard of this lag can lead to overstatement of the speed of monetary 
effects. Thus, if short-run money demand is always equal to the balance held, 
a lag in response of money demand to changes in interest rates, which as said 
implies large changes in interest rates as a result of portfolio adjustments to 
open market operations, can offset long lags in the response of  investment 
expenditures to changes in interest rates and thus shorten the lag in effect on 
GNP (Tucker 1966). But such an offset does not necessarily  occur if lags in 
portfolio adjustments mean as noted that short-run money demand is not im- 
mediately equated to the actual balances held. 